Abstract The classic cake-cutting problem is extended from individual agents to groups of agents. Applications include dividing a land-estate among families or dividing disputed lands among states. In the standard cake-cutting model, each agent should receive an individual subset of the cake with a sufficiently high individual value. In our model, each group should receive a subset with a sufficiently high "group value". Six ways to define the aggregate group value based on the values of the group members are examined: four based on cardinal welfare functions and two based on ordinal preference relations. Our results show that the choice of the group value function has crucial implications on the existence and applicability of fair division protocols. JEL classification: D63
Introduction
A land-estate has to be divided among several families. Every member in every family has different ideas about the desirability of different parts of the land, e.g, some prefer the parts near the sea, some prefer the parts having more fruit trees, etc. What would be a fair division of the land among the families?
This question is examined here in the framework of the cake-cutting problem, which has been studied by economists and mathematicians since the 1940s. In the classic setting, there is a heterogeneous good (called "cake") which has to be divided fairly among n agents. Several fairness requirements have been studied. The most common ones are proportionality and envyfreeness. The proportionality requirement is to give each agent a share with a subjective value of at least 1/n of the total cake value (Steinhaus 1948) . The envy-freeness requirement is to give each agent a share that he weakly prefers to all other shares (Gamow and Stern 1958; Foley 1967; Weller 1985) . The cake-cutting problem has been the topic of hundreds of papers. See the books by Brams and Taylor (1996) ; Robertson and Webb (1998) ; Barbanel (2005) ; Brams (2007) and a recent survey by Procaccia (2015) for more information.
In all these works, the cake is divided to individual agents: each agent receives an individual piece which should be fair according to his individual preferences. However, many realistic division problems involve groups. As an example, consider a land-estate inherited by k families, or a disputed land that should be divided among k states. The land should be divided to k pieces, one piece per group. Each group's share is then used by all members of the group together: in case of families, all family members live together in their share; in case of countries, the received share may become public land. Hence, the happiness of each group member depends on the entire value of the group's share. But, in each group there are different people with different preferences. How should fairness be defined in this setting?
Example 1 A land is divided among k states. In each state, one third of the population feel that their state received 3/k of the total while the other twothirds feel that their state received a worthless share. Is this division fair?
We suggest two approaches for answering this question: cardinal and ordinal.
Cardinal approach
Each agent i is assumed to have an additive value function V i over subsets of the cake. To ensure equal treatment of the agents, the value functions are normalized such that the value of no cake is 0 and the value of the entire cake is 1. Every group j has a collective welfare function W j , which aggregates the value functions of the group members to a single group-value. A division is group-proportional if every group j receives a plot X j for which: W j (X j ) ≥ 1/k.
We study four collective welfare functions. The first three are based on the classic utilitarian, egalitarian and Nash welfare functions (see chapter 3 of Moulin (2004) ):
1. An allocation is called arithmetic-mean-proportional if each of the k groups receives a piece for which the arithmetic mean of the group members' values is at least 1/k, i.e for every group j: W j = 1 nj · i V i , where the sum is taken over all members of group j and n j is the number of these members. In Example 1, the arithmetic mean of the values in each group is 1/k, so the division is arithmetic-mean-proportional.
Arithmetic-mean-proportionality has two justifications. Theoretically, it adheres to the utilitarian principle, by which social welfare is the sum of the utilities of the members. Economically, it may be possible to transfer utility between members of a group after the division is made. Members who are more satisfied with the division can somehow compensate the less satisfied members, such that each agent enjoys the average utility.
2. An allocation is called minimum-proportional if each group receives a piece for which the minimum if its members' values is at least 1/k, i.e for every group j: W j = min i V i . Equivalently, a division is minimum-proportional if all members in each group agree that their group's share is worth at least 1/k of the total. In Example 1, the minimum value is 0 so the division is not minimum-proportional.
Minimum-proportionality adheres to the egalitarian principle (Rawls 1971 ) by which social welfare is the utility of the least satisfied agent. It makes sense when the land is divided among small groups such as families. In this case, it is reasonable to expect that all members in each group are happy with the division.
3. An allocation is called geometric-mean-proportional if each group receives a piece for which the geometric mean of its members' values is at least 1/k, i.e. for every group j: W j = [ i V i ] 1 n j . In Example 1, the geometric mean of the values in each group is 0, so the division is not geometric-meanproportional.
Geometric-mean-proportionality corresponds to the Nash welfare function (the product of the members' utilities), which is considered a plausible compromise between the utilitarian and egalitarian functions (Moulin 2004) .
4. An allocation is called median-proportional if each group receives a piece for which the median of its members' values is at least 1/k. Equivalently, a division is median-proportional if at least half of the members in each group believe that their group received at least 1/k of the total value.
Median-proportionality makes sense when the cake is divided between states with a democratic regime. After a division is proposed, each group conducts an approval voting in which each citizen approves the division if he/she feels that it gives his/her group at least 1/k of the total. The division is implemented only if, in every group, at least half of its members approve it.
In Example 1, the median value is 0 so the division is not median-proportional. Indeed, only 1/3 of the population in each group would agree that the division is proportional, so the division is likely to be rejected in any democratic referendum.
The four welfare functions described above can be used with envy-freeness instead of proportionality. However, not all combinations make sense. For example, "minimum-envy-freeness" only means that, the minimum value assigned by a group member to the group's current share, is at least as large as the minimum value assigned by a group member (possibly another member) to any other share; it does not mean that all group members agree that their group's share is better than all other shares. Envy-freeness makes more sense in the ordinal approach, which is described next.
Ordinal approach
Each agent is assumed to have a preference relation over subsets of the cake. The preference relation can be represented by a value function, but this function need not be additive or normalized as it is used only for comparisons. Ideally we would like to define a group-preference-relation, but Arrow's impossibility theorem implies that this cannot be done in a satisfactory way. Hence, we take a different approach and define the fairness of an allocation based directly on the individual preference relations.
An allocation is called envy-free for agent i if agent i weakly prefers his group's share to the share of any other group.
5. An allocation is called unanimous-envy-free if it is envy-free for all members of all groups.
6. An allocation is called majority-envy-free if for each group, the allocation is envy-free for at least half the group members.
Implication relations between fairness criteria
Six group-fairness criteria were presented: four cardinal and two ordinal. They are related by various implication relations, as illustrated in Figure 1: -The implication relations between the four cardinal criteria follow from the fact that: minimum ≤ median and minimum ≤ geometric-mean ≤ arithmetic-mean. -The implication relations between the ordinal criteria are obvious by the definitions. -The implication relations between cardinal and ordinal criteria (denoted by thin lines) are valid only when the value functions are additive. When, in addition to additivity, there are exactly k = 2 groups, the implication is bi-directional (i.e. median-proportionality is equivalent to majority-envyfreeness and minimum-proportionality is equivalent to unanimous-envyfreeness).
arithmetic-mean proportionality gemoetric-mean proportionality minimum proportionality median proportionality unanimous envy-freeness majority envy-freeness Two challenges arise once the group fairness criterion is selected. First, determine whether there always exists a division satisfying this criterion. In case the answer is yes, determine whether there exists a protocol for achieving such a division.
Cake-cutting protocols are traditionally characterized by two factors: the number of connectivity components in the final division, and the number of queries required to achieve the division. We now briefly explain each of these factors, as they are relevant to our results.
Number of connectivity components
Ideally, we would like to allocate to each group a single, connected piece. This requirement is especially meaningful when the divided resource is land, since a contiguous piece of land is much easier to use than a collection of disconnected patches. However, a division with connected pieces is not always possible.
In fact, many countries have a disconnected territory. A striking example is the India-Bangladesh border. According to Wikipedia, 2 "Within the main body of Bangladesh were 102 enclaves of Indian territory, which in turn contained 21 Bangladeshi counter-enclaves, one of which contained an Indian counter-counter-enclave... within the Indian mainland were 71 Bangladeshi enclaves, containing 3 Indian counter-enclaves". Another example is BaarleHertog -a Belgian municipality made of 24 separate parcels of land, most of which are exclaves in the Netherlands.
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In case a division with connected pieces is not possible, it is desirable to minimize the number of connectivity components (hence: components) in the division. Minimizing the number of components is a common requirement in the cake-cutting literature. It is common to assume that the cake is a 1-dimensional interval. In this case, the components are sub-intervals and their number is one plus the number of cuts. Hence, the number of components is minimized by minimizing the number of cuts (Robertson and Webb 1995; Webb 1997; Shishido and Zeng 1999; Barbanel and Brams 2004, 2014) .
In a realistic, 3-dimensional world, the additional dimensions can be used to connect the components, e.g, by bridges or tunnels. Still, it is desirable to minimize the number of components in the original division in order to reduce the number of required bridges/tunnels.
The goal of minimizing the number of components is also pursued in reallife politics. Going back to India and Bangladesh, after many years of negotiations they finally started to exchange most of their enclaves during the years 2015-2016. This is expected to reduce the number of components from 200 to a more reasonable number.
Number of queries
The most common model for cake-cutting protocols is the query model, formally defined by Robertson and Webb (1998) . Intuitively, a cake-cutting protocol uses two types of queries: a mark query (also called cut query) asks an agent "where would you cut the cake such that the value of the resulting piece is X?" and an eval query asks an agent "how much is piece Y worth for you?". This model has been used to prove results about the query complexity of cake-cutting protocols. For example, the Banach-Knaster protocol (Steinhaus 1948) uses O(n 2 ) queries. The Even-Paz protocol (Even and Paz 1984 ) achieves a proportional division using only O(n log n) queries. This query-complexity is the best possible, since Edmonds and Pruhs (2011) proved that any protocol for proportional division requires Ω(n log n) queries.
Interestingly, some cake-cutting problems cannot be solved with a finite number of queries. Robertson and Webb (1998) (pp. 103-104) proved that for 2 or more agents, an exact division (giving each of n agents a piece with a value of exactly 1/n) cannot be achieved by a finite protocol. Stromquist (2008) proved that for 3 or more agents, an envy-free division (in which each agent values its piece at least as much as any other piece) cannot be achieved by a finite protocol when the pieces must be connected.
Results
Our results regarding the six group-fairness criteria are summarized in the following theorems. In all theorems, k is the number of groups and n > k is the total number of agents in all groups. Each group is assumed to have at least 2 members. When the four cardinal criteria are discussed, the agents' value functions are implicitly assumed to be additive.
A property of cake partitions is called feasible if for every k groups and n agents there exists an allocation satisfying this property. Otherwise, the property is called infeasible.
Theorem 1 When group-fairness is defined by arithmetic-mean-proportionality: (a) Group-fairness with connected pieces is feasible. (b) A group-fair allocation, with either connected or disconnected pieces, cannot be found by a finite protocol.
Theorem 2 When group-fairness is defined by minimum-proportionality, geometric-mean-proportionality or unanimous-envy-freeness:
(a) Group-fairness with connected pieces is infeasible. Moreover, at least n components might be required for a group-fair allocation under any of these definitions.
(b) Group-fairness with disconnected pieces is feasible. Moreover, the number of required components is at most:
proportionality and geometric-mean-proportionality.
(c) A group-fair allocation cannot be found by a finite protocol.
Theorem 3 When group-fairness is defined by median-proportionality or majority-envy-freeness:
(a) When k ≥ 3, group-fairness with connected pieces is infeasible. Moreover, at least n · k/2−1 k−1 components might be required for a group-fair allocation under any of these definitions.
(b) Group-fairness with disconnected pieces is always feasible. Moreover, the number of required components is at most:
(⌈x⌉ is the ceiling of x -the smallest integer which is at least as large as x.) The results are summarized in Table 1 . For k = 2 groups, the results are tight: in all fairness models, we know that a group-fair division exists with the smallest possible number of connectivity components. For k > 2 groups, the results are not tight. As an illustration of the currently unsolved gaps, the table includes numeric values for k = 3 and k = 4.
Conclusions
One practical conclusion that can be drawn from our results concerns the selection of fairness criterion. When n (the total number of agents) is sufficiently small, it is reasonable to use unanimous-or minimum-fairness, which guarantees that all agents are satisfied with their group's share. However, when n is large, as is the case when dividing land between countries, insisting on unanimous-fairness might result in each country having an absurdly fractioned territory. In this case, majority-or median-fairness is a more reasonable choice. This is particularly true when there are only two groups, since in this case majority-and median-fairness can be achieved with connected pieces and in finite time, which is impossible with the other fairness criteria.
Although majority-fairness might leave up to half the citizens unhappy, this may be unavoidable in real-life situations. This adds an aspect to Winston Churchil's dictum: "democracy is the worst form of government, except all the others that have been tried".
Paper structure
Section 2 formally presents the model. Sections 3, 4 and 5 are devoted to proving Theorems 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Section 6 discusses some alternative models and directions for future research and Section 7 reviews some related literature.
Model and Notation
The cake to be divided is C. As in many cake-cutting papers, C is assumed to be the unit interval [0, 1] .
The total number of agents in all groups is n. Every agent i ∈ {1, ..., n} has a subjective value function V i , defined on the Borel subsets of C. The V i are assumed to be absolutely continuous with respect to the length measure (or simply continuous). This implies that all singular points have a value of 0 to all agents (a property often termed nonatomicity). Hence the value of an interval is the same whether or not it includes its boundary points.
When the four cardinal fairness conditions are discussed, the value functions are also assumed to be additive -the value of a union of two disjoint pieces is the sum of the values of the pieces. Such value functions can be viewed as having a "constant marginal utility" property (Chambers 2005) . In these cases, the value measures are normalized such that ∀i :
We call agents with additive normalized value functions, additive agents. The continuity, additivity and normalization assumptions are common to most cake-cutting papers.
The number of groups is k. The groups are called G j , j ∈ {1, ..., k}. The number of members in group G j is n j . It is assumed that n j ≥ 2. Each agent is a member of exactly one group, so n = k j=1 n j . Each group G j has to receive a piece, which is a Borel subset X j ⊆ C. The k pieces are pairwise-disjoint. Ideally, we would like that each piece be connected (i.e, an interval). If this is not possible, then each piece should be a finite union of intervals, where the total number of components (intervals) should be as small as possible.
In the division procedures presented here, it is assumed that all agents act according to their true value functions and not strategically. Designing cakecutting mechanisms that take agents' strategies into account is a challenging task even for individual agents (Chen et al 2013) and we leave it to future work.
Arithmetic-mean fairness
In this section we prove Theorem 1. We assume that the value functions of the agents are additive and normalized, and define the following collective welfare functions:
A division is arithmetic-mean-proportional if ∀j : W j (X j ) ≥ 1/k.
Existence
Lemma 1 Given any n additive value functions
., n and any grouping of the agents to k groups, there exists an arithmetic-mean-proportional division of the cake to the groups such that each group receives a connected piece (the total number of components is k).
Proof Given any n additive value functions V i , the k group-value functions W j defined above are also additive. Hence, the classic cake-cutting results are applicable: each of the k groups in our problem can be treated as an individual agent in the classic solution. For example, the protocols of Steinhaus (1948) ; Even and Paz (1984) imply the existence of an arithmetic-mean-proportional division in which each group receives a connected piece.
Non-existence of finite protocols
While the existence results from classic cake-cutting are applicable to group cake-cutting, their query complexity is not preserved: in classic cake-cutting, a proportional division can be found by a polynomial number of queries (see Subsection 1.5), but in group cake-cutting, any finite number of queries might be insufficient.
Lemma 2 For k ≥ 2 groups with at least 2 members in each group, an arithmetic-mean-proportional division cannot be found by a finite protocol.
Proof We prove that the lemma is true even in the simplest case in which there are only two groups with two members in each group. Suppose the groups are G 1 = {1, 2} and G 2 = {3, 4}. Suppose the agents are paired such that V 1 ≡ V 3 (agent 1 and agent 3 have the same value function) and V 2 ≡ V 4 . This means that both groups have the same group-value function: W 1 ≡ W 2 . Finding an arithmetic-mean-proportional division now amounts to finding a piece X ⊆ C such that W 1 (X) = W 2 (X) = 1/2. This is equivalent to finding a X ⊆ C such that W 1 (X) + W 2 (X) = 1. Hence, our lemma reduces to the following lemma:
Lemma 3 There is no finite protocol that, given two agents with value measures V 1 and V 2 satisfying V 1 (C) = V 2 (C) = 1, always finds a piece X ⊆ C such that V 1 (X) + V 2 (X) = 1.
Proof (sketch) Each mark or eval query reveals to us the valuation of a single agent for a finite number of intervals. Hence, after a finite number of queries, there is a finite number of possible pieces (finite unions of intervals) for which we know the valuations of the agents. However, for every V 1 , there is a continuum of possible values of V 2 to the different intervals. Only a finite number of these values allows us to construct a piece whose sum of values is exactly 1. Hence, a finite protocol has no hope of finding such a piece. A detailed proof is given in Appendix A.
Minimum, Geometric-mean and Unanimous Fairness
In this section we prove Theorem 2. We start with the cardinal criteria (minimum-proportionality and geometric-mean-proportionality) and then indicate which results are valid also for unanimous-envy-freeness. We denote by MinProp(n, k) the problem of finding a minimum-proportional division when there are n agents grouped in k groups. The notations GeomMeanProp(n, k) and UnanimousEnvyFree(n, k) are used analogously.
Initially, all value functions are assumed to be additive and normalized. For minimum-proportionality, define the following collective welfare functions:
for j ∈ {1, ..., k}.
For geometric-mean-proportionality, define:
In general, even if the V i are additive, the W j are not additive, so the classic results on proportional cake-cutting cannot be used to solve MinProp(n, k) or GeomMeanProp(n, k). However, another classic cake-cutting problem can be used: the problem of exact division: 4 Definition 1 Exact(N, K) is the following problem. Given N agents and an integer K, find a division of the cake to K pieces, such that each of the N agents assigns exactly the same value to all pieces:
Alon (1987) proved that for every N and K, Exact(N, K) has a solution with at most N (K − 1) + 1 components. He also showed that this number is the smallest that can be guaranteed. We now use these results in our setting. To this end, we show a two-way reduction between the problem of minimumproportional division and the problem of exact division.
Exact implies Minimum-proportional
Lemma 4 When the agents are additive, a solution to Exact (n−1, k) implies a solution to MinProp (n, k) and GeomMeanProp (n, k) for any grouping of the n agents to k groups.
Proof Suppose we are given an instance of MinProp(n, k), i.e, n agents divided into k groups. Select n − 1 agents arbitrarily. Use Exact(n − 1, k) to find a partition of the cake to k pieces, such that each of the n−1 agents is indifferent between these k pieces. By additivity, each agent values each piece as exactly 1/k. Ask the n-th agent to choose his favorite piece. Give that piece to the group to which the n-th agent belongs. By the pigeonhole principle, that agent values that piece as at least 1/k. Give the other k − 1 pieces arbitrarily to the remaining k −1 groups. The resulting division is minimum-proportional, hence also geometric-mean-proportional.
Combining this lemma with the result of Alon (1987) immediately implies the following upper bound on the number of required components:
Corollary 1 Given n additive agents in k groups, there exists a minimumproportional and geometric-mean-proportional allocation of the cake to the groups such that the total number of components is at most (k − 1) · (n − 1) + 1.
With a more careful analysis, an improved upper bound can be attained. As an example, consider the case of k = 4. Using 3(n − 1) cuts, the cake can be divided to 4 pieces which are considered equal by all n members. But for a minimum-proportional division, it is not required that all members think that all pieces are equal, it is only required that all members believe that their group's share is worth at least 1/4. This can be achieved as follows:
-Using n cuts, divide the cake to two pieces which all n agents value as exactly 1/2. Call the two pieces West and East. -Assign arbitrary two groups to West and the other two groups to East.
Mark by n W the total number of members in the groups assigned to West and n E the total number of members assigned to East. -Using n W cuts, divide the West to two pieces which all n W agents value as exactly 1/4. Give a piece to each group. Divide the East similarly using n E cuts.
The first step requires n cuts and the second step requires n W + n E = n cuts too. Hence the total number of cuts required is only 2n. In fact, two cuts can be saved in each step by excluding two members from the division. These members will not think that the division is equal, but they will be allowed to choose the favorite piece for their group. Thus only 2(n − 2) cuts are required. A simple inductive argument shows that whenever k is a power of 2, (log 2 k) · (n − k/2) cuts are required. For general k, a result by Stromquist and Woodall (1985) can be used. They prove that, for every fraction α ∈ [0, 1], it is possible to cut a piece of cake such that all n agents agree that its value is exactly α using at most 2n − 2 cuts.
5 This can be used as follows:
-Select integers l, m ∈ {1, ..., k − 1} such that l + m = k.
-Apply Stromquist and Woodall (1985) with w = l/k: using 2n − 4 cuts, cut a piece X which n − 1 agents value as exactly l/k. This means that these n − 1 agents value the other piece, Y, as exactly m/k. -Let the n-th agent choose a piece for his group; assign the other groups arbitrarily such that l groups are assigned to piece X and the other m groups to piece Y . -Recursively divide piece X to its l groups and piece Y to its m groups.
After a finite number of recursion steps, the number of groups assigned to each piece drops to 1 and the procedure ends. The number of cuts in each level of the recursion is at most (2n − 4). The depth of recursion can be bounded by ⌈log 2 k⌉ by dividing k to halves (if it is even) or to almost-halves (if it is odd; i.e. when k = 2m + 1, divide it to m + (m + 1)). Hence:
Corollary 2 Given any n additive agents in k groups, there exists a minimum-proportional and geometric-mean-proportional allocation of the cake to the groups such that the total number of components is at most (⌈log 2 k⌉) · (2n − 4) + 1.
We now examine which of the above results hold when the value functions are ordinal (not additive). The following lemma is an ordinal analogue of Lemma 4 and can be proved in exactly the same way:
Lemma 5 A solution to Exact (n − 1, k) implies a solution to UnanimousEnvyFree (n, k) for any grouping of the n agents to k groups.
While the theorem of Alon (1987) was stated for continuous measures, the proof does not use additivity -it only uses continuity.
6 Hence, the theorem is still true when the value functions are not additive and we have the following analogue of Corollary 1:
Corollary 3 Given n agents in k groups, there exists a unanimous-envy-free allocation of the cake to the groups such that the total number of components is at most
We do not know of a non-additive analogue to the theorem of Stromquist and Woodall (1985) so we do not have an analogue of Corollary 2 for the ordinal fairness criterion.
Remark on division procedures: When k = 2, a procedure described by Simmons and Su (2003) can be used to approximate a minimum-proportional division. It is an infinite procedure that converges to an exact division of a cake to two pieces. When k is a power of two, this procedure can be applied recursively. We are not aware of a constructive procedure for the existence result of Stromquist and Woodall (1985) . Hence, when k is not a power of two, our results are purely existential.
Minimum-Proportional implies Exact

Lemma 6 When the agents' value functions are additive, a solution to MinProp (N (K − 1) + 1, K) implies a solution to Exact (N, K).
Proof Given an instance of Exact(N, K) (N agents and a number K of required pieces), create K groups. In each of the first K − 1 groups, put a copy of each of the N agents. In the K-th group, put a single agent whose value measure is the average of the given N value measures:
The total number of agents in all K groups is N (K − 1) + 1. Use MinProp (N (K − 1) + 1, K) to find a minimum-proportional division. In that division, for each agent i in group j: V i (X j ) ≥ 1/K. By construction, each of the first K − 1 groups has a copy of agent i. Hence, all N agents values each of the first K − 1 pieces as at least 1/K and: ∀i = 1, ..., N :
Hence, by additivity, every agent values the K-th piece as at most 1/K:
The piece X K is given to the agent with value measure V * , so by proportionality: V * (X K ) ≥ 1/K. By construction, V * (X K ) is the average of the V i (X K ). Hence, necessarily:
Again by additivity:
Hence, necessarily:
So we have found an exact division and solved Exact(N, K) as required.
Corollary 4 A minimum-proportional division for N (K − 1) + 1 agents and K groups might require at least N (K − 1) + 1 components.
A more general result is proved by the following example. It shows that a geometric-mean-proportional division for n agents might require at least n components. Hence, the same is true for minimum-proportional and unanimous-envy-free allocations (by the implications in Figure 1 ):
Example 2 Assume that n = mk and assume that there are k groups with m members in each group. The groups are numbered by j = 0, ..., k − 1 and the members in each group by i = 0, ..., m − 1. The land is the 1-dimensional interval [0, mk] . In each group j, each member i wants only the following interval: (ik + j, ik + j + 1). Thus there is no overlap between desired pieces of different members. The distance between the desired intervals of two adjacent members of the same group is k. Here is an illustration for k = 3, m = 4, where the desired intervals of each group are represented by a different color:
In any geometric-mean-proportional allocation, X j (the piece allotted to group j) must have a positive value for every member, so it must touch the m desired intervals of its m members.
X j cannot contain a component which touches two different desired intervals, since such a component would necessarily cover k − 1 desired intervals of members in other groups, making their value 0. Hence, X j must have at least m components. Hence, the total number of components must be at least mk = n.
As already mentioned, (Robertson and Webb 1998, pages 103-104) proved that Exact(N, K) cannot be solved by a finite protocol whenever N ≥ 2 and K ≥ 2. By Lemma 6, this implies:
Corollary 5 MinProp and UnanimousEnvyFree cannot be solved by a finite protocol whenever n > k.
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The analogous impossibility result for geometric-mean-proportionality follows from Lemma 2, since arithmetic-mean-proportionality implies geometricmean-proportionality.
Summary
Three bounds on the number of components were presented in this section.
The lower bound is n, and there are two upper bounds: (k − 1) · (n − 1) + 1 and (⌈log 2 k⌉) · (2n − 4) + 1 (the former bound is better for small k and the latter is better for large k).
For the special case k = 2, the lower bound coincides with the first upper bound. Thus, there is a complete solution for two groups: there exists a groupfair division with at most n components, and this is the smallest number with which a group-fair division is guaranteed to exist, for all 4 group-fairness criteria studied in this section.
For k ≥ 3 groups, there is a gap between the bounds. For example, for k = 3, we know that there always exists a group-fair division with at most 2n − 1 components, but we cannot exclude the possibility that such a division is attainable with only n components.
New techniques, different than reduction to exact division, may be needed to find such divisions.
Median and Majority fairness
In this section we prove Theorem 3, starting with median fairness. The collective-welfare functions in this case are:
Existence and number of components
The W j are not additive, so the classic protocols for proportional cake-cutting are not applicable. Moreover, the impossibility result implied by Corollary 4 can be generalized as follows.
Lemma 7
Assume there are n = mk additive agents, divided into k groups with m members in each group. In a division that is considered proportional by at least q members in each group, the total number of components might have to be at least:
Proof Consider Example 2. Say that a group member is happy if he values the piece given to his group as at least 1/k. Otherwise, the member is unhappy. Suppose the piece X j (the piece given to group G j ) is made of l ≥ 1 components. We can make l members of G j happy using l intervals of length 1/2. However, if q > l, we also have to make the remaining q−l members happy. For this, we have to extend q − l intervals to length k. Each such extension totally covers the desired part of one member in each of the other groups. Overall, each group renders q − l members of each of the other groups, totally unhappy. The number of unhappy members in each group is thus (k − 1)(q − l). Adding the q members which must be happy in each group, we get the following necessary condition: (k − 1)(q − l) + q ≤ m. This is equivalent to:
The total number of components is k · l, which is at least the expression stated in the Lemma.
For a minimum-proportional division, q = m, l ≥ m and the number of components is at least km = n, which is the bound of Corollary 4. For a median-proportional division, q = m/2, 8 since at least half of the members of each group must agree that the division is proportional. Hence we get:
Corollary 6 In a median-proportional division with n agents grouped into k groups, the number of components might have to be at least
The same impossibility result holds for majority-envy-freeness, since with additive agents, majority-envy-freeness implies median-proportionality. Note that when k = 2, the lower bound of Corollary 6 is 0. Indeed, for two groups there always exist majority-envy-free allocations and medianproportional allocations with connected pieces. This is proved in the next subsection.
As a first positive result, the existence results of Section 4 can be used with n/2 instead of n. In particular, for majority-envy-freeness, select half of the members in each group arbitrarily, then find a division which is unanimousenvy-free for them while ignoring all other members. Hence:
Corollary 7 Given n agents in k groups, there exists a majority-envy-free allocation of the cake to the groups such that the total number of components is at most (k − 1) · (n/2 − 1) + 1.
When the agents are additive, the result is true for median-proportionality too. However, for median-proportionality, better bounds are proved in the next subsection.
Division protocols
Algorithm 1 describes a procedure that can be used to achieve a medianproportional division. The procedure works in two steps.
Step 1: Halving. For each group, a location M j is calculated such that, if the cake is cut at M j , half the group members value the interval [0, M j ] as at least k . We say that these members are "happy". Similarly, the ⌊k/2⌋ eastern groups -for which M j ≥ M * -are Algorithm 1 M ajorityP rop(n, k)
INPUT: -A cake, which is assumed to be the unit interval [0, 1].
-n additive agents, all of whom value the cake as 1.
-A grouping of the agents to k groups, G 1 , ..., G k .
OUTPUT:
A median-proportional division of the cake to k pieces.
ALGORITHM:
-Each agent i = 1, ..., n selects an
.., k, find the median of its members' selections: M j = median i∈G j x i . -Order the groups in increasing order of their medians. Find the median of the group medians: M * = M ⌈k/2⌉ . Cut the cake at x = M * .
-Define the western groups as the G j with j = 1, ..., ⌈k/2⌉. Let n W be the total number of members in these groups. Divide the interval [0, M * ] among the western groups using MinProp(n W /2, ⌈k/2⌉).
-Similarly, define the eastern groups as the G j with j = ⌈k/2⌉ + 1, ..., k. There are ⌊k/2⌋ such groups. Let n E be their total number of members. Divide the interval (M * , 1] among the eastern groups using MinProp(n E /2, ⌊k/2⌋).
assigned to the eastern interval (M * , 1]; at least half the members in each of these groups are "happy", i.e, value the interval (M * , 1] as at least
k . If there are only two groups (k = 2), then we are done: there is exactly one western group and one eastern group (⌈k/2⌉ = ⌊k/2⌋ = 1 ). For each group j ∈ {1, 2}, W j (X j ) ≥ 1/2 as at least half the members of each group value their group's share as at least 1/2. Hence, the allocation of X j to group j is median-proportional. If there are more than two groups (k > 2), an additional step is required.
Step 2: Sub-division. Each of the two sub-intervals should be further divided to the groups assigned to it. In each group G j , at least n j /2 members are happy. So for each G j , select exactly n j /2 members which are happy. Our goal now is to make sure that these agents remain happy. This can be done using a minimum-proportional allocation, where only n j /2 happy members in each group (hence n/2 members overall) are counted. The minimumproportional allocation guarantees that every western-happy-member believes that his group's share is worth at least
Similarly, every eastern-happy-member believes that his group's share is worth at least
Hence, the resulting division is median-proportional. Note that this step cannot be done using a finite protocol since it uses MinProp. We do not know if median-proportional allocations for 3 or more groups can be found using a finite protocol.
We now calculate the number of components in the resulting division. One cut is required for the halving step. For the minimum-proportional division of the western interval, the number of required cuts is at most (⌈k/2⌉ − 1) · (n W /2 − 1) by Corollary 1, and at most ⌈log 2 ⌈k/2⌉⌉ · (n W − 4) by Corollary 2. Similarly, for the eastern interval the number of required cuts is at most the minimum of (⌊k/2⌋ − 1) · (n E /2 − 1) and ⌈log 2 ⌊k/2⌋⌉ · (n E − 4). The total number of components is thus at most min[(⌈k/2⌉−1)·(n/2−2) , ⌈log 2 ⌈k/2⌉⌉· (n − 8)] + 2 (when k is a power of two, the number of components decreases to log 2 (k/2) · (n/2 − k/2) + 2).
When k = 2, Algorithm 1 works and produces a majority-envy-free allocation, even when the value functions are not additive. The only change is that in the first step, each agent i = 1, ..., n should select an
, 1]) (the agent is indifferent between the western and eastern part). In contrast to the impossibility results of the previous sections, this protocol is finite. In fact, it requires only n mark queries (one query per agent).
When k > 2, the algorithm does not work for the ordinal fairness criterion and we currently only have the pure existence result of Corollary 7.
Discussion and Future Work
In future work, it may be interesting to study different voting rules. For example, instead of producing a single allocation and letting the members in each group decide whether to accept it using an approval voting, it is possible to produce several different allocations and let the members in each group choose an allocation using plurality voting. This opens the door to the well-known strategic issues studied in social choice theory.
One could consider the following alternative fairness criterion: an allocation is individually-proportional if the group allocation X = (X 1 , . . . , X k ) admits a refinement Y = (Y 1 , . . . , Y n ), where for each group G j , ∪ i∈Gj Y i = X j , such that for each agent i, V i (Y i ) ≥ 1/n. Individually-proportional allocations always exist and can be found by using any classic proportional cake-cutting procedure on the individual agents, disregarding their groups. The number of components is at most n. Individual-proportionality makes sense if, after the land is divided between the groups, each group intends to further divide its share among its members. However, often this is not the case. For example, consider a land-estate divided between two families. The members of each family plan to live and use their entire share together, rather than dividing it among them. Therefore, the happiness of each family member depends on the entire value of his family's share, rather than on the value of a potential private share he would get in a hypothetic sub-division. There are intermediate cases, for example: when land is divided between countries, agricultural lands may be further divided to individual citizens, while natural reserves may remain public. In such cases, a certain mix of individual-proportionality and median-proportionality may be considered.
Most fairness criteria studied here, particularly for three or more groups, cannot be implemented by a finite protocol. In the end of Subsection 4.1 we briefly mentioned a procedure that can be used to approximate a minimumproportional division in some cases. The general problem of finding good approximation procedures for group cake-cutting is still open.
Related Work
There are numerous papers about fair division in general and fair cake-cutting in particular. We mentioned some of them in the introduction. Here we survey some work that is more closely related to group fairness.
7.1 Group-envy-freeness and on-the-fly coalitions Berliant et al (1992) ; Hüsseinov (2011) study the concept of group-envy-free cake-cutting. Their model is the standard cake-cutting model in which the cake is divided among individuals (and not among groups as in our model). They define a group-envy-free division as a division in which no coalition of individuals can take the pieces allocated to another coalition with the same number of individuals and re-divide the pieces among its members such that all members are weakly better-off. Coalitions are also studied by Dall'Aglio et al (2008); Dall'Aglio and Di Luca (2012) .
In our setting, the groups are pre-determined and the agents are not supposed to form coalitions on-the-fly. In an alternative model, in which agents are allowed to form coalitions based on their preferences, the group cakecutting problem becomes easier. For instance, it is easy to achieve a minimumproportional division with connected pieces between two coalitions: ask each agent to mark its median line, find the median of all medians, then divide the agents to two coalitions according to whether their median line is to the left or to the right of the median-of-medians.
Fairness in group decisions
The notion of fairness between groups has been studied empirically in the context of the well-known ultimatum game. In the standard version of this game, an individual agent (the proposer ) suggests a division of a sum of money to another individual (the responder ), which can either approve or reject it. In the group version, either the proposer or the responder or both are groups of agents. The groups have to decide together what division to propose and whether to accept a proposed division.
Experiments by Robert and Carnevale (1997) ; Bornstein and Yaniv (1998) show that, in general, groups tend to act more rationally by proposing and accepting divisions which are less fair. Messick et al (1997) studies the effect of different group decision rules while Santos et al (2015) uses a threshold decision rule which is a generalized version of our majority rule (an allocation is accepted if at least M agents in the responder group vote to accept it).
These studies are only tangentially relevant to the present paper, since they deal with a much simpler division problem in which the divided good is homogeneous (money) rather than heterogeneous (cake/land).
Non-additive utilities
The prevalent assumption in the cake-cutting literature is that the value functions are additive. As mentioned above, a major source of difficulty in finding minimum-proportional, geometric-mean-proportional and median-proportional allocations is that, even when the individual value functions are additive, the group value functions are not additive. We are aware of several previous works on cake-cutting with non-additive valuations. Berliant et al (1992) ; Maccheroni and Marinacci (2003) ; Dall'Aglio and Maccheroni (2005) focus on sub-additive, or concave, valuations, in which the sum of the values of the parts is more than the value of the whole. These works are not applicable to the group cake-cutting problem, because the group-value functions are not necessarily sub-additive -the sum of values of the parts might be less than the value of the whole. Sagara and Vlach (2005) ; Dall'Aglio and Maccheroni (2009) ; Hüsseinov and Sagara (2013) consider general non-additive value functions. They provide pure existence proofs and do not say much about the nature of the resulting divisions (e.g, the number of connectivity components), which we believe is important in practical division applications. Su (1999) presents a protocol for envy-free division with connected pieces which does not assume additivity of valuations. However, when the valuations are non-additive, there are no guarantees about the value per agent. In particular, with non-additive valuations, the resulting division is not necessarily proportional.
Mirchandani (2013) suggests a division protocol for non-additive valuations using non-linear programming. However, the protocol is practical only when the cake is a collection of a small number of homogeneous components, where the only thing that matters is what fraction of each component is allocated to each agent. Our model is the standard, general model where the cake is a single heterogeneous good.
Finally, Berliant and Dunz (2004) ; Caragiannis et al (2011); Segal-Halevi et al (2015) study specific non-additive value functions which are motivated by geometric considerations (location, size and shape). The present paper contributes to this line of work by studying specific non-additive value functions which are motivated by a different consideration: handling the different preferences of group members. A possible future research topic is to find fair division rules that handle these considerations simultaneously, since both of them are important for fair division of land.
A Infinity of Arithmetic-Mean-Proportionality
Given two agents with value measures V 1 and V 2 (normalized such that V 1 (C) = V 2 (C) = 1), define an average piece as a piece X ⊆ C such that: V 1 (X) + V 2 (X) = 1. As explained in the text, finding an arithmetic-mean-proportional division is reducible to finding an average piece. We now prove that finding an average piece might require an infinite number of queries (Lemma 3).
Each eval or mark query involves two points in [0, 1]: in an eval query, both points are determined by the protocol; in a mark query, one point is replied by the agent. Call these points the "known points" and include the endpoints 0 and 1 in the set of known points. Let Pm be the set of known points before step m. Initially P 1 = {0, 1}. Each query potentially increases Pm by at most two points. For example, after a mark(0.1, v) query with a reply of 0.2, Pm = {0, 0.1, 0.2, 1}. The protocol can be conceptually divided into steps, such that in each step, one point is added to Pm. Hence, for every m ≥ 1, |Pm| = m + 1.
If the protocol returns a result at step m, this result must be a collection of intervals whose endpoints are in Pm, since the values of subsets with different endpoints are not known to the protocol. Let Im be the set of m intervals whose endpoints are nearby points in Pm. If the protocol returns at step m, the result must be a subset of Im. Let Vm = {V 1 (X) + V 2 (X)|X ⊆ Im}. I.e, Vm is the set of all values of pieces that can be returned by the protocol at step m. Note that Vm is finite and |Vm| ≤ 2 m . The protocol can return an average piece at step m, if and only if 1 ∈ Vm. We now prove that this cannot be guaranteed in a finite protocol.
The proof is by induction on m. For m = 1, Vm = {0, 2} so 1 / ∈ Vm. V 1 is illustrated by the dots: To conclude: after any finite number m of steps, the set of possible piece values Vm is finite, and an adversary can select the value measures such that it does not contain 1. Hence finding an average piece cannot be guaranteed.
Note: A similar idea was used by Robertson and Webb (1998) to prove that it is impossible to find an exact division with a finite number of queries.
